Self-ownerliness

Individual and community in Early Heidegger: Situating das Man, the Man-self, and Self-ownership in Dasein's Ontological Structure
Edgar C. Boedeker Jr:

"In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims that (1) das Man is an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man-self, but can also be eigentlich*, which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning, and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning. I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both and, thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Man and the Man-self. Das Man is one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existentiell', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Man-self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man. What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself."


*eigentlich is an example of a particle that has no semantic (truthconditional) meaning, but rather signals which role a speech act plays within the given discourse by blocking contextually salient conclusions that otherwise might be drawn by the recipient.

Heidegger acted very shabbily during the Nazi regime, which just goes to show that thinking about Selfhood does not give you Selfhood.